

RECENT DATA AND TRENDS IN NIGER AND THE SAHEL

August 07, 2023



INTRODUCTION

African news is marked by the situation in Niger, which has experienced a coup since July 26, 2023, the outcome of which is not yet known.

This situation follows a trend observed over the past three years in neighboring countries. Countries which have in common with Niger to belong to the Sahelian zone and to face a growing terrorist threat.

This Sahelian zone is also the place of confrontation between the Western powers and the emerging powers which wish to rally Africa to a process of redefining the order of the world.

In order to contribute to the rapid and synthetic understanding of the major trends affecting the African continent, STRATEGIES! makes available to the interested public a summary called “MACRO – TRENDS FOR AFRICA”.

The “Macro – Trends for Africa” are:

- ✓ A summary of the different trends on the political, economic, security and humanitarian levels.
- ✓ A presentation of recent developments in some of the key areas of life on the continent.
- ✓ An overview of key data and statistics to measure the weight of certain phenomena on the functioning of African States and the lives of populations.
- ✓ A summary of the recommendations made by experts and major international institutions for decision-makers and key development actors in Africa.

Hoping that you will find them useful, the team in charge of Macro – Trends of Cabinet STRATEGIES! wish you a good reading of this synthesis on Niger.

NB: The information presented was collected on 07 August 2023.

SUMMARY

- I. Overall evolution of the situation in the Sahel in recent years
- II. Situation in Niger before the coup of July 26, 2023
- III. Major developments after the coup in Niger
- IV. Relations between France and Niger
- V. Consequences of the coup in the countries of the Sahel
- VI. Approaches and potential solutions to exit the Sahel from political and security instability



I - OVERALL EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN THE SAHEL

In this section

- a) The five major challenges of the Sahel
- b) Evolution of terrorism in the Sahel over the past 15 years
- c) Dynamics of violence in the Sahel in 2022
- d) Evolution of security threats in the Sahel in 2022
- e) Overview of countries under military rule in West Africa in 2023
- f) General trends observable in the countries of the Sahel that have experienced coups

The Sahel faces at least five major key challenges



Terrorism deaths in Africa's Sahel spike 2,000% in 15 years

43% of all terrorism-related fatalities in 2022 were in the Sahel region, where 22,074 people have been killed in 6,408 terror attacks between 2007 and 2022



4 OF THE 10 COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORISM IN THE WORLD ARE IN THE SAHEL



The region has a population of


ABOUT 135 MILLION

2022




12 of the 20 deadliest terrorist attacks in the world and **43% of all terrorism deaths in 2022 were in the Sahel**

Burkina Faso, where **1,135 people** were killed in **310 terrorist attacks**, had the **largest global increase** in 2022



Deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa 2007–2022

Since 2012, the Sahel has comprised most deaths from terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

The Sahel is the most affected region, accounting for 43% of deaths from global terrorism, 7% more than the previous year.

<https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf>

The Sahel as a percentage of global terrorism deaths




Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations
Global Terrorism Index 2023



The Sahel is home to the fastest growing and deadliest terrorist groups in the world.

Terror deaths in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 2012–2022


Terrorism deaths have escalated dramatically in these countries in the past decade to become the epicentre of global terror.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations


Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali are the most affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Burkina-Faso and Mali accounted for 73% of deaths in the Sahel and 52% of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa in 2022.

FIVE ZONES OF MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUP VIOLENCE IN THE SAHEL



Terror deaths across tri-border regions

Terrorism deaths are concentrated in the regions where Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger border each other.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker; IEP calculations

The spatial dynamics of terrorism in the Sahel shift from northeast Nigeria to the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN THE SAHEL IN 2022

- **Three zones, the center of Mali, the Three Borders and the center-north of Burkina Faso , experience more than half (55%) of the violent events in the region. This underscores the importance of central Mali as a base and staging area for attacking neighboring areas.**
- Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel continue to exploit border regions where they can take advantage of a reduced security presence. **Thus, the border districts suffered 65% of the violent incidents counted in 2022.**
- Given rising levels of violence, **exposed borders remain particularly vulnerable** , especially in Niger and for coastal countries.
- **The targeting of civilians appears to be a deliberate tactic to intimidate local communities in order to force them either to cooperate or to flee.** This gives militant Islamist groups both more strength and territorial control.
- **At least some of the violence against civilians seeks to control gold revenues and trafficking networks** , reflecting the increasingly criminal nature of militant group activity in many of these areas.

EVOLUTION OF SECURITY THREATS IN THE SAHEL IN 2022


Of the 135 administrative districts in Mali, Burkina Faso and western Niger, 84 districts, or almost two-thirds, suffered attacks from violent extremists in 2022.

In 2017, this figure was less than a third (i.e. 40 districts).

In 2017, more than 80% of violent events occurred in 30 districts in northern and central Mali.

In 2022, more than two-thirds of violent events attributed to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel occurred outside Mali, most of them in Burkina Faso.

OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES UNDER MILITARY RULE IN WEST AFRICA IN 2023




In July 2023, officially 06 countries in the Sahel are under military rule:

- Mali (Since August 2020)
- Chad (Since April 2021)
- Guinea (Since September 2021)
- Sudan (Since October 2021)
- Burkina Faso (Since January 2022)
- Niger (July 2023)

GENERAL TRENDS OBSERVABLE IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL THAT HAVE EXPERIENCED COUPS

- Persistence of security difficulties in some cases are advance of terrorist groups (Zone of the three borders)
- Degradation or even rupture of cooperation ties with France in particular and other Western countries in general
- Tensions, divergences and sometimes ruptures in relations with UN missions and international organizations present in countries in transition
- Struggle with sub-regional institutions that have taken sanctions against states in transition
- Suspension, increase in restrictions and human rights violations
- Growing protests against French policy branded as neo-colonial and security ineffective
- Recourse and growing influence of Russia and private military companies
- Redeployment of Western powers to counter Russian influence in the sub-region



ALGERIA

LIBYA

MALI

NIGER

CHAD

o Niamey

II - SITUATION IN NIGER BEFORE THE JULY 2023 COUP

BENIN




In this section

- a) Nigerien today
- b) Key dates in the history of Niger
- c) Overview of coups in the Sahel since 1952
- d) Evolution of Niger under the Issoufou and Bazoum presidencies
- e) Strategic weight of Niger in the Sahelian region
- f) Weight of Nigerien Uranium on a global scale
- g) Weaknesses of the Nigerien economy in 2023
- h) Security situation in Niger at the end of 2022
- i) Terrorist groups active in Niger
- j) Overview of international forces present in Niger to fight terrorism


Niger to date

- **Capital:** Niamey
- **Area:** 1,267,000 km²
- **Population:** 24.4 million inhabitants
- **Languages:** French, Arabic, Buduma, Fulfulde, Gourmanché, Hausa, Kanuri, Zarma, Songhai, Tamasheq, Tassawaq, Teb
- **Life expectancy:** 60 years (men) 62 years (women)

KEY DATES IN THE HISTORY OF NIGER




KEY DATES IN THE HISTORY OF NIGER



SINCE 1952, THE SAHELIAN ZONE HAS RECORDED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF COUPS

- Niger is one of the countries that have experienced the most coups in Africa
- Bazoum succeeded President Mahamadou Issoufou, who stepped down after his second term, as provided by the constitution which limits them to two.
- This succession was the first instance of a peaceful transfer of power in the history of Niger.
- This democratic trajectory was only beginning after a long history of military governance in Niger, which experienced four putsches between 1974 and 2010.
- On March 31, 2021, officers attempted to overthrow Mahamadou Issoufou, two days before the inauguration of Mohamed Bazoum.




<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600>

<https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/attempt-de-coup-detat-au-niger-fiche-dinformation/>

EVOLUTION OF NIGER UNDER ISSOUFOU AND BAZOUM

- **Per capita income increased by 26% in Niger** , reversing the long trend of previous decades.
- **Economic growth in recent years remains strong** . The World Bank predicts that real gross national product growth will reach almost 7% in 2023 and 12.5% in 2024.
- Despite the increase in food prices caused by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, **Niger has managed to maintain its inflation rate at around 4%, the lowest rate in the Economic Union and West African currency.**
- **Niger's human development index has been steadily improving for ten years.**



https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Niger/human_development/

<https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/attempt-de-coup-detat-au-niger-fiche-dinformation/>

STRATEGIC WEIGHT OF NIGER IN THE SAHELIAN REGION


- **Geographically**, it is the largest country in West Africa.
- **Economically**, the country is rich in uranium - it produces 7% of all the world's reserves. The radioactive metal occupies such an important place in the economy of the country that one of the main arteries of the capital, Niamey, bears the name of Avenue de l'Uranium.
- However, the population of Niger is consistently ranked as having the lowest standard of living in the world.
- **Politically**, it has been seen as an example of relative democratic stability in recent years, while its neighbors Mali and Burkina Faso have previously succumbed to military coups.
- **Strategically**, it hosts French and American military bases and is considered a key partner in the fight against Islamist insurgents.
- Western nations had seen in Niger a **bulwark against worsening disorder and the extension of Russian influence in the region**.
- The US State Department describes Niger as "**important as a pivot of stability in the Sahel**" and "**a reliable counterterrorism partner**" against various Islamist groups linked to the Islamic State or al-Qaeda.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66339528>

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_AF_Niger_Public.pdf

Weight of Nigerien Uranium on a global scale

- Globally, “**Niger has become a secondary producer over the years, as production costs there are high and prices plummeted until 2016 after [the nuclear accident in] Fukushima**”, according to Teva Meyer, lecturer at the University of Haute-Alsace and researcher at IRIS.
- Thus, in 2022, **Niger represented only 4% of world production**, far behind Kazakhstan (43%), Canada (15%), Namibia (11%) and Australia (8%).



WEAKNESSES OF THE NIGERIEN ECONOMY IN 2023

1. **Climatic shocks:** Niger is a Sahelian country that is regularly affected by climatic shocks, such as droughts and floods, which can affect agricultural production and economic growth.
2. **Commodity price volatility:** Niger is a country that exports raw materials, particularly uranium, gold and oil. The volatility of the prices of these raw materials can affect the country's export earnings and economic growth.
3. **Insecurity:** Niger is facing a security crisis in the border areas with Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mali, where armed groups perpetuate attacks against security forces and civilians. This insecurity can affect investments and economic development in these regions.
4. **Economic dependence:** Niger is an undiversified economy, dependent on agriculture for 40% of its GDP. This economic dependence can make the country vulnerable to external economic shocks.
5. **Governance challenges:** Niger faces governance challenges, including corruption and weak institutions. These challenges can affect investor confidence and the country's economic growth.

<https://www.banquemonddiale.org/fr/country/niger/overview>

<https://www.afdb.org/fr/countries/west-africa/niger/niger-economic-outlook>

SECURITY SITUATION IN NIGER AT THE END OF 2022

- Deterioration of the situation during the last 4 months of 2022, through the multiplication of the number of security incidents attributed to non-state armed groups of various affiliations, self-defense groups and marginally to defense and security forces
- The border areas of Tillabéry, Diffa, Maradi and Tahoua are the most affected areas from a security and humanitarian standpoint in Niger.
- Between September and December 2022, nearly 1,699 security and protection incidents were reported, resulting mainly in civilian victims (at least 8,000 people).
- As of December 31, 2022, four regions (Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua and Tillabéry) were still the most affected by the security and humanitarian crisis in Niger, despite the multifaceted risks (attacks, threats, incursions by armed groups, extortion of property/theft, etc.), which weigh on other regions of the country.
- More than 377,000 people forcibly displaced due to the security crisis as of December 31, 2022.

TERRORIST GROUPS ACTIVE IN NIGER

(NB: COMPLEX AND EVER-CHANGING SITUATION)

1. JNIM: Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) is a jihadist group that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger. It is a merger of the Saharan branch of AQIM, al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine and Katiba Macina.

2. ISIS-GS: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) is an affiliate of the Islamic State that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger.

3. ISIS-WA: Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA) is an affiliate of the Islamic State that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger.

4. Boko Haram: Boko Haram is a jihadist group that operates primarily in Nigeria but has also carried out attacks in neighboring countries including Niger.

5. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): AQIM is a jihadist group that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger.

6. Al Murabitoun: Al Murabitoun is a jihadist group that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger.

7. Ansar Dine: Ansar Dine is a jihadist group that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger.

8. Katiba Macina: Katiba Macina is a jihadist group that operates in the Sahel region, including Niger.

OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES PRESENT IN NIGER TO FIGHT TERRORISM

FRANCE :

- About 1,500 French soldiers are currently present on Nigerien territory.
- They are mainly in the capital "Niamey" and in the area of the three borders (Ayorou, Ouallem and Agadez)

UNITED STATES:

- About 1,000 American soldiers (Special Forces) are currently on Niger soil.
- The USA has granted \$500,000,000 in financial aid since 2012.

GERMANY :

- About 300 Italian soldiers and a hundred German soldiers are stationed in Niger.
- Germany trains the Niger special forces and is also the main contributor to the training mission launched in Niger in December 2022 by the EU.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWvVvu6oYbl>



III – MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE COUP IN NIGER

In this section

- a) July 26-28, 2023: Key facts about the coup
- b) Explanatory hypotheses of the Coup d'etat
- c) Criticisms against President Mohamed Bazoum
- d) Overview of reactions to the coup
- e) Overview of sanctions following the coup
 - a) ECOWAS Sanctions
 - b) Sanctions from international actors
- f) Overview of the positions of some non-Western countries
- g) Overview of positions of Sahel countries opposing sanctions
- h) Measures and initiatives taken by the military in power

July 26-28, 2023: Key facts about the coup

- The coup in Niger took place on July 26, 2023.
- Current President Mohamed Bazoum is held captive with his family by the Nigerien armed forces
- General Tchani affirms during his speech that the coup d'etat is undertaken to avoid "**the progressive and inevitable disappearance**" of the country, and affirms that Bazoum tries to hide "**the harsh reality**" of the country, which he describes as "**a lot of dead, displaced, humiliation and frustration**".
- The Chief of Defense Staff announces his support for the putschists to "**avoid a bloodbath**".
- General Tchani proclaims himself president of the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland on July 28, 2023.



Explanatory hypotheses of the Coup d'Etat in Niger

1. Discontent within the presidential guard: Reports suggest that the coup attempt in Niger may have been sparked by the outgoing leader of the presidential guard, who was unhappy at being sidelined. **Internal power struggles and grievances within the military or security forces can contribute to coup attempts.**

2. Rising cost of living and perceptions of government incompetence: Analysts have pointed to the rising cost of living and the perception of government incompetence as potential factors behind the coup. **Economic challenges and public dissatisfaction with governance can create an environment conducive to political unrest.**

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/attempted-coup-in-niger-an-explainer/>

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/coup-attempt-in-niger-heres-what-we-know-so-far>



Explanatory hypotheses of the Coup d'Etat in Niger

3. Worsening insecurity in the Sahel: The perpetrators of the coup cited the worsening insecurity in their takeover speech. The Sahel region is grappling with a deteriorating security situation, including the presence of armed groups and violent extremism. **The government's perceived inability to effectively address security challenges may have contributed to political instability.**

4. Historical Context of Coups in West Africa: Democracy in the region is often described as superficial, with underlying conditions that persist and contribute to coup attempts. **Foreign influence and strategic competition are also cited as factors that make coups more likely to occur.**

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/attempted-coup-in-niger-an-explainer/>

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/coup-attempt-in-niger-heres-what-we-know-so-far>

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-27/what-s-behind-niger-coup-and-others-in-west-africa>

<https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577>



CRITICISMS AGAINST PRESIDENT BAZOUM

1. **Security measures deemed insufficient** to deal with the activity of jihadist rebels in Niger
2. **A failure to address the root causes or underlying factors** contributing to the rise of jihadist rebel activity in Niger
3. **Ineffective regional cooperation** : the government of Bazoum did not engage effectively with neighboring countries and regional initiatives to combat the terrorist threat
4. **A strong dependence on foreign aid in general and on the security level in particular** (Reference to the partnership with France, the United States and other Western countries)

<https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/NER>

<https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/niger/>


<https://www.csis.org/analysis/niger-bulwark-against-further-instability-west-africa>

OVERVIEW OF SOME REACTIONS TO THE COUP

Condemnation reactions	Support reactions
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• West African (ECOWAS) leaders have imposed sanctions on Niger and threatened military action against the coup leaders• Calls for the restoration of democracy: The United States and France, Niger's great security allies, have called for the restoration of democracy in the country• Several Western states and international organizations (World Bank, European Union, etc.) have suspended their cooperation with Niger	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Major demonstrations of support for the military in power• Ruling party headquarters burned down• The French Embassy was attacked by some demonstrators• Mali and Burkina Faso have expressed their solidarity and their readiness to act in support of the ruling junta in Niger

OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOLLOWING THE COUP IN NIGER

- Nigeria, which covers 70% of Niger's electricity needs, cut the line supplying Niger and stopped supplying electricity.
- The World Bank has announced the suspension of payments for operations in Niger other than private partnerships.
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has announced that member countries have ceased all commercial activity with Niger.
- The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) also froze all of Niger's assets due to the coup.



ECOWAS SANCTIONS AGAINST NIGER

1. Closure of air and land borders between Niger and WAEMU countries.
2. Prohibition of overflight of the airspace for any aircraft from or to Niger.
3. Suspension of all commercial and financial transactions between WAEMU countries and Niger, including those involving petroleum products, electricity, goods and services.
4. Suspension of all financial transactions between WAEMU countries and Niger.
5. Freezing of the financial and monetary assets of the State of Niger at the BCEAO and in the commercial banks of the WAEMU countries.
6. Freezing of the financial and monetary assets of Niger's public and parastatal enterprises at the BCEAO and in the commercial banks of the WAEMU countries.
7. Suspension of financial transactions between banks in Niger and banks established in other WAEMU countries.
8. Suspension of all assistance and financial transactions in favor of Niger by WAEMU financing institutions, in particular BOAD.
9. Travel ban for the perpetrators of the coup attempt, freezing of their financial assets and confiscation of their assets.
10. Application of the travel ban, asset freeze and confiscation of property to all civilians or military persons participating in institutions or bodies of government established by the military in the coup, as well as to their families, who will also be banned from staying in WAEMU countries.

SANCTIONS FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Entity	Amount of aid suspended
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• On July 29, 2023, France announced that it was suspending, "with immediate effect, all its development aid and budget support actions in Niger".• In 2022, French aid was 120 million euros.• It should be slightly higher in 2023.
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• On Sunday July 30, 2023, the UK said it would maintain "critical" humanitarian aid, but suspended long-term development aid.• The United Kingdom has contributed nearly 59 billion CFA francs to Niger's development between 2021 and 2022
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• On July 31, 2023, the German government suspended its budget support in the amount of 23 million euros• In addition to the 23 million, another 70 million euros will be suspended in the next two years according to the German federal government.

SANCTIONS FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Entity	Amount of aid suspended
European Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• On July 29, 2023, the European Union announced the suspension of its security and financial cooperation with Niger, after the coup.• The EU has allocated 503 million euros from its budget to Niger for the period 2021-2024
UNITED STATES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• On August 4, 2023, the head of American diplomacy Antony Blinken announced the suspension of aid programs to the government of Niger but will continue their humanitarian aid deemed necessary.• US aid to Niger has been set at \$233 million for 2023.
world Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• On August 2, the World Bank (WB) announced in a press release that it had suspended disbursements "for all its operations and until further notice" to Niger.• The World Bank spent 1.5 billion dollars in the country in 2022 through its various aid programs and had so far paid 730 million dollars since the beginning of this year 2023.

OVERVIEW OF POSITIONS OF NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES

Country	Reactions to the coup in Niger
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Russia opposes a military solution to the conflict.• Russia says it has no intention of using its armed forces in Niger.
China	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• China believes that Niger and regional countries have the wisdom and ability to find a political solution to the current situation• Through its Foreign Minister, China has indicated that President Bazoum is a friend of China and wishes that his personal safety be guaranteed.• China also attaches great importance to the safety of its nationals in Niger.• The minister also pointed out that the Chinese Embassy in Niger will maintain close communication with Chinese nationals and institutions in Niger.


<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/china-hopes-niger-will-find-political-resolution-coup-2023-08-03/>

<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/613688-niger-coup-russia-opposes-military-action-wont-deploy-troops-ambassador.html>

OVERVIEW OF POSITIONS OF NON-WESTERN COUNTRIES

Country	Reactions to the coup in Niger
Saudi Arabia	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Foreign Ministry released a statement saying the kingdom was following events in the West African country with "great concern", but did not use the word "coup".
Türkiye	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• "We follow with deep concern the coup attempt perpetrated by a group within the armed forces in Niger," the Turkish Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
United Arab Emirates	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• "The United Arab Emirates condemned the attempted coup in the Republic of Niger and stressed the importance of maintaining stability and security in the country," the UAE Foreign Ministry said. in a press release.

OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES "FOR OR AGAINST" ECOWAS MILITARY INTERVENTION



OVERVIEW OF POSITIONS OF SAHEL COUNTRIES OPPOSING SANCTIONS

Country	Positions
Burkina Faso	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The soldiers who run the country maintain that any military intervention against the Nigerien putschists will be considered a "declaration of war" against Burkina Faso.• Burkinabe military authorities said they "refused to apply" the "illegal, illegitimate and inhumane sanctions against the people and authorities of Niger".
mali	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mali's military government issued a joint statement with Burkina Faso in support of the coup in Niger.• The statement states that any military intervention against Niger would amount to a "declaration of war" against the two countries and could have "disastrous consequences" that could "destabilize the entire region".
Guinea	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conakry considers that "the sanctions measures recommended by ECOWAS including military intervention" are an option that cannot "be a solution to the current problem" and would rather lead to "a human disaster whose consequences could go beyond the borders. of Niger".• "The CNRD underlines that a military intervention against Niger would de facto lead to the dislocation of ECOWAS" and formally dissociates itself from the "sanctions taken and the threats made during the summit of July 30, 2023" in Abuja and which "do not in any way engage the Republic of Guinea".

MEASURES AND INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE MILITARY IN POWER

(AS OF AUGUST 07, 2023)



Continued detention of President Mohamed Bazoum at the presidential palace



Suspension of all institutions



Block rejection of sanctions imposed by ECOWAS



Meeting of the transitional authorities of Mali and Burkina Faso to strengthen cooperation and face international pressure




Announcement of the revocation of military cooperation agreements with France



Closure of land and air borders



Appointment of a Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine



IV - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND NIGER IN 2023

SECURITY RELATIONS

- **Niger is a key country for France** in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel.
- **France has redirected the majority of its military forces involved in the Barkhane counter-terrorism operation in Mali** there, after being forced to end this operation in 2022 under pressure from the Malian junta installed in power after a coup.
- **Military cooperation:** France has maintained close military cooperation with Niger, including providing training, equipment and other forms of support. French forces have helped Niger counter threats from jihadist insurgencies and extremist groups.
- **Transit base:** Niger served as a transit base for French military operations in the region, particularly in Mali. The French army has reinforced its presence in Niger in recent years.

<https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/23/niger-france-is-testing-its-new-military-approach-in-africa/>


<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/terrorism-france-s-international-action/>

URANIUM FROM NIGER AND FRANCE

- "The French State has renounced all transparency on its uranium supplies for about ten years", according to **David Boilley**, associate professor of physics, doctor in nuclear physics and president of the Association for the control of radioactivity in West (ACRO).
- The French State nevertheless released some figures, on June 16, 2023, within **the High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security**.
- It reads in particular that Niger represented **35% of French imports of concentrated uranium in 2020 and 34% in 2021**. That is the first rank in 2020 and the second in 2021 behind Kazakhstan.

Niger accounts for a third of imports

Breakdown of the origin of uranium imported into France



Graphique: Ouest-France. • Source: Direction générale de l'énergie et du climat.


Weight of Nigerian Uranium for France

Over the last ten years, the 88,200 tonnes of **natural uranium** imported into France came mainly from three countries:

1. Kazakhstan (27%)
2. Niger (20%)
3. Uzbekistan (19%).

Five countries supplying uranium in 2022

Quantity of natural uranium imported into France



Source : Comité technique Euratom

TO DATE, THREE URANIUM MINES ARE OPERATED BY ORANO IN NIGER

1. **The Air mines, whose operating company Somair is 63.4% owned by Orano,** are based near the town of Arlit (in the desert north of Niger). Almost exhausted, its operation has however been extended until 2040.
2. **The Akokan mining site, about ten kilometers from Arlit, has been closed since the end of March 2021.** The reserves being exhausted after four decades of exploitation, the Akouta mining company, 59% owned by Orano, is now working to a site redevelopment project.
3. **Finally, Orano owns 63.52% of the company operating the Imouraren mine, located 80 kilometers south of Arlit, and considered to be one of the largest uranium deposits in the world.** But after an operating permit was issued in 2009, production at the site was suspended for lack of favorable market conditions.

NB: The multinational Orano (formerly Areva) is 90% owned by the French State.

MAIN FACTORS IN CONTESTING THE PRESENCE OF FRANCE IN NIGER

The rejection of Barkhane: As early as September 2022, several hundred people had protested against the French anti-jihadist force in the streets of Niamey, at the call of M62, a movement from civil society. Demonstrations following their departure from Mali and Burkina Faso.



The rejection of French "imperialism": More and more opinion leaders and associations are calling for an end to "Francafrique" and all the mechanisms of French domination over these former colonies.



Russia's Growing Influence in Africa: More and more political leaders and opinion leaders are calling for relations with Russia to deal with the security challenges that arise in the countries of the Sahel.




V - KEY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES FOR NIGER AND THE SAHEL

In this section

- a) Reminder of the causes and factors favoring political instability and insecurity in the Sahel
- b) Weight of climate change in instability and conflicts in the Sahel
- c) Economic difficulties caused by the Coup d'Etat in the countries of the Sahel
- d) Major questions for the months and years to come for Niger and the Sahel

COUNTRIES UNDER MILITARY RULE IN THE SAHEL IN AUGUST 2023

- The Sahel has been characterized by a resurgence of coups d'etat in recent years.
- These coups have both political and security impacts.
- To assess the future evolution of the situation, it is important to have in perspective:
 - The root causes of political and security instability
 - The actual and potential consequences of these coups



REMINDER OF THE CAUSES AND FACTORS FAVORING POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY IN THE SAHEL

- 1. Poor governance:** Weak and illegitimate governance, characterized by corruption, democratic backsliding, legitimacy deficits and human rights violations, has contributed to the spread of violent extremism in the Sahel.
- 2. Economic decline:** Many countries in the Sahel have experienced economic decline, which has contributed to social and political instability.
- 3. Communal conflicts:** Communal conflicts have also contributed to political instability in the Sahel.
- 4. Military Intervention:** Military intervention by France and other outside powers has failed to stem the growing destabilization of the region.
- 5. Foreign Influence:** Foreign influence and strategic competition have made coups more likely to occur.
- 6. Youth unemployment:** Youth unemployment has also contributed to political instability in the Sahel.

<https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577>

<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/coups-detat-and-political-instability-sahel-implications-fight-against-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-april-2022>

CLIMATE CHANGE ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE SAHEL

1. Environmental challenges:

The Sahel region is already characterized by harsh environmental conditions, and climate change is exacerbating these challenges. Rising temperatures and more frequent extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods, are having a significant impact on people's livelihoods.



2. Economic challenges:

Climate change affects agricultural productivity, water availability and natural resources, which are vital for the economies of the Sahelian countries. Declining agricultural yields and increased resource scarcity can lead to economic decline, poverty and food insecurity, contributing to political instability.




3. Competition for resources and conflicts:

Climate change-induced resource scarcity, such as water and arable land, can intensify competition between communities and ethnic groups. This competition can degenerate into conflicts over access to resources, exacerbating political instability in the region.

CLIMATE CHANGE ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE SAHEL

4. Migration and displacement:

The impacts of climate change, such as droughts and desertification, can lead to increased migration and displacement of people. This can strain resources and create social tensions, potentially contributing to political instability.



5. Weak governance and institutions:

Climate change can strain governance systems and institutions, making it more difficult for governments to respond effectively to environmental and socio-economic challenges. Weak governance and institutional failures further contribute to political instability in the Sahel.

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY THE COUP D'ETAT IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL

- 1. Deterioration of the economic situation:** Coups often lead to a deterioration of the economic situation, which can exacerbate poverty and food insecurity. This can have a significant impact on people's livelihoods, especially in rural areas.
- 2. Disruption of trade and investment:** Coups disrupt trade and investment, leading to a decline in economic activity and foreign investment. This can further exacerbate economic decline and poverty.
- 3. Reduced access to aid and development assistance:** Coups can lead to reduced aid and development assistance, as donors may be reluctant to support governments that have arrived in power by undemocratic means. This can further exacerbate poverty and economic decline.
- 4. Rising inflation and currency devaluation:** Coups can lead to higher inflation and currency devaluation, making it difficult for people to access basic goods and services.
- 5. Reduced government revenue:** Coups can lead to reduced government revenue, as investors and businesses may be reluctant to invest in an unstable political environment. This can further exacerbate economic decline and poverty.

<https://www.icct.nl/publication/counter-terrorism-sahel-increased-instability-and-political-tensions>

<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/coups-detat-and-political-instability-sahel-implications-fight-against-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-april-2022>

Major questions for the months and years to come for Niger and the Sahel

1. The issue of ECOWAS military intervention to restore President Bazoum
2. The question of the presence of French, American and other western countries troops in Niger
3. The consequences of regional and international sanctions on the political, economic and social life of Niger
4. The future of development projects and investments in Niger
5. The nature and impact of regional strategies to counter terrorists and other criminal actors in the Sahel
6. The role and modalities of intervention of Russia and/or the Wagner group in Niger and in the Sahel in general
7. The future of President Bazoum
8. The future and credibility of ECOWAS if it fails to restore constitutional order in Niger.



VI – APPROACHES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO BRING THE SAHEL OUT OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY INSTABILITY

In this section

- a) Approaches for sustainable solutions to political and security instability in the countries of the Sahel

- b) Avenues for lasting solutions to political and security instability in the Sahel

APPROACHES FOR SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS

1. Address root causes

2. Develop a global approach

3. Support local perceptions and participation

4. Strengthen regional cooperation

5. Deploy sustained international support and coordination

APPROACHES TO BRING SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY INSTABILITY IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL

1. Address root causes:

It is important to address the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel, including governance issues, development gaps and social issues have been highlighted for years. This approach recognizes that addressing these underlying factors is crucial for long-term stability and security in the region.



2. Overall approach:

It is crucial to adopt a comprehensive approach that integrates political, security and development strategies. This approach recognizes the interconnected nature of security challenges and the need for coordinated efforts across multiple sectors.




3. Support local perceptions and participation:

It is important to understand and address local perceptions of insecurity. This includes engaging with local communities, involving civil society organizations and ensuring the meaningful participation of local actors in security and governance processes.

APPROACHES TO BRING SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY INSTABILITY IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE SAHEL

4. Strengthening of regional cooperation:

It is vital to strengthen military and security cooperation between Sahelian countries and with international partners. This includes sharing intelligence, conducting joint operations, and coordinating efforts to deal with cross-border threats.



5. International support and coordination:

Integrate the need for continued international support and coordination to address the security challenges in the Sahel. This includes financial assistance, capacity building and coordination of efforts between international actors, regional organizations and Sahelian countries.

AVENUES FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL

Reduce poverty and provide basic services

Strengthen local governance

Coping with economic decline

Promote democracy and good governance

Strengthen regional partnerships and collaboration

Addressing the role of external actors

<https://www.icct.nl/publication/counter-terrorism-sahel-increased-instability-and-political-tensions>

<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/coups-detat-and-political-instability-sahel-implications-fight-against-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-april-2022>

ACTING ON POVERTY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

1. Reducing poverty and providing basic services: Efforts must focus on reducing poverty and providing basic services to address the structural drivers of instability. This includes investing in education, health care and infrastructure development to create opportunities and improve living conditions.

2. Strengthen local governance: Strengthening local governance is key to addressing the root causes of political instability. This includes promoting transparency, accountability and participation in decision-making processes.

<https://www.icct.nl/publication/counter-terrorism-sahel-increased-instability-and-political-tensions>

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ECONOMY, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

3. Coping with economic decline: Economic decline is an important factor of political instability in the Sahel. Addressing this requires implementing economic reforms and development initiatives to stimulate economic growth and attract investment.

4. Promoting democracy and good governance: Promoting democracy and good governance is essential to addressing the root causes of political instability. This includes strengthening democratic institutions, promoting human rights and ensuring the rule of law.

<https://www.icct.nl/publication/counter-terrorism-sahel-increased-instability-and-political-tensions>

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PARTNERSHIPS AND ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

5. Strengthen regional partnerships and collaboration: Regional leadership and cooperation are key to addressing security threats in the Sahel. Strengthening regional partnerships and collaboration is crucial to addressing security threats in the region.

6. Addressing the role of external actors: Addressing the role of external actors is key to addressing the root causes of political instability in the Sahel. This includes promoting transparency and accountability in international relations and ensuring that external actors do not compromise the sovereignty of the states concerned.

<https://www.icct.nl/publication/counter-terrorism-sahel-increased-instability-and-political-tensions>

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